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THE  CURIOUS  INCIDENT  OF  THE  SUPREME
COURT  IN MYRIAD  GENETICS
Dan L. Burk*
ABSTRACT
Often what is not said is as significant as what is said.  In its recent Myriad Genetics
decision, the United States Supreme Court is curiously silent about the relationship between its
holding in that case and the holding in its immediately previous patent subject matter case,
Mayo v. Prometheus.  This reticence is all the more puzzling given that the Court initially
remanded Myriad to the lower courts for reconsideration in light of the Mayo holding.  The
Court’s silence regarding Mayo leaves uncertain the relationship between the “products of
nature” doctrine that serves as the basis for the Myriad decision, and the “laws of nature”
doctrine that has been the basis of nearly all of its other subject matter cases.  In this Article I
assemble the clues in the laws of nature cases to suggest what the Court might have said or might
still say regarding products of nature.
INTRODUCTION
This is an essay about something not said.  In its recent gene patenting
opinion in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court held that genomic DNA sequences (gDNA)
that had been extracted and purified from human cells fell outside of patent-
able subject matter.1  It further held that claims to another type of nucleotide
sequence, complementary DNA (cDNA) that had been replicated in the lab-
oratory, did fall within patentable subject matter.2  And the Court squarely
held that there exists a judicially created doctrine on products of nature that
distinguishes between the two types of molecules.3
But what is not said is often as important as what is said.  In Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle’s mystery story, Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes announces that
© 2014 Dan L. Burk.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine.  I thank Mike
Madison, the participants in the ETH Zurich TransAtlantic Intellectual Property
Conference, and the participants in the Stanford Law School Health Law Seminar for their
comments on previous versions of this work.
1 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117–18 (2013).
2 Id. at 2119.
3 Id. at 2116.
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the critical clue to solving the mystery presented is the “curious incident of
the dog in the night-time.”4  When the ever-hapless Scotland Yard Inspector
Gregory observes that the dog did nothing in the nighttime, Holmes
responds, “[t]hat was the curious incident.”5
Despite all that it did say in its Myriad opinion, the Supreme Court said
not a word explaining the relationship of the products of nature doctrine to
the holding in its previous opinion in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., decided only a year before.6 Mayo was also a case about
patentable subject matter.  In the Mayo opinion, the Court declared claims to
a medical diagnostic test to be excluded from patentable subject matter,
because they read on a law or principle of nature. Mayo concerned the dis-
position of natural processes; Myriad involved the disposition of natural sub-
stances.7  The Court is prone to mention both in the same breath,8 but their
relationship remains unarticulated.
The Court’s deafening silence on this relationship is particularly odd
given the procedural history of the Myriad decision.  It began conventionally
enough with a district court decision that was affirmed in part and reversed
in part by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.9  The parties peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.  But while the Myriad petition was
pending, the Supreme Court decided the Mayo case and remanded Myriad to
the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Mayo opinion.10
One might think, given its earlier instruction to the intermediate court
to reconsider Myriad in light of Mayo, that the Court might have expressed
some view on the connection between the cases.  Indeed, the Myriad opinion
begins by citing Mayo regarding the patentability of natural law.11  But it
quickly moves on to discuss unpatentable products rather than unpatentable
principles without a word about the relationship between the two.12  The ulti-
mate holding regarding Myriad’s claims to DNA molecules is as silent on the
subject as Holmes’s dog in the nighttime.
A good deal has been written about Mayo and the Court’s laws of nature
jurisprudence.13  No doubt a good deal will be written about the implications
4 A. CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1, 22 (New York,
A.L. Burt Co. 1894).
5 Id.
6 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
7 See Dan L. Burk, Are Human Genes Patentable?, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPE-
TITION L. 747, 749 (2013).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 49–61.
9 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
10 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012)
(mem.) (order granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding).
11 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct 2107, 2116 (2013).
12 See Burk, supra note 7, at 749.
13 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathe-
matical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341, 341–42 (2013) (discussing Mayo and noting
the opportunity the Court had to “clarify the applicable rules” of patent eligibility in Myr-
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of the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad.14  But my brief here is to trace
the connections between the two that the Court left unarticulated in the lat-
ter opinion.  I begin by reviewing salient features of the Myriad decision itself
and the somewhat dubious history of the “product of nature” doctrine.  I
then turn to the parallel line of cases regarding laws of nature, tracing the
conceptual threads that culminate in the Mayo decision.  I conclude by look-
ing for some consonance or point of contact between the two lines of cases
and by suggesting the work that remains to be done, probably by lower
courts, to articulate the connections that the Supreme Court left unspoken.
I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF DNA
Even without its strange silence regarding the Mayo decision and princi-
ples of nature, the Myriad opinion would be something of a puzzle.  The case
presented to the Supreme Court involved patents over two types of genetic
molecules: genomic DNA, or “gDNA” that was extracted from human cells,
and complementary DNA or “cDNA” that was synthesized in the laboratory
using a process called reverse transcription, and which would generally not
occur in the normal course of human cellular function.15  In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court found the gDNA not patent
eligible, but the cDNA to fall within patentable subject matter.16
The principal opinion from the intermediate Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit also held that the cDNA was the patent eligible product of
human manipulation.17  But it additionally held that the gDNA was patenta-
ble subject matter, because extraction from the cell separated the gene
sequence from the larger chromosome in which it was embedded, changing
the chemical structure of the molecule.18  The Supreme Court rejected that
logic, opining that because the sequence of nucleotides in the extracted mol-
ecule was the same as that found in the native chromosome, the extracted
molecule was for subject matter purposes a product of nature.19
This reasoning is at best incoherent.20  Thomas’s opinion tells us that
the Myriad genomic DNA is unpatentable, because it is for subject matter
purposes identical to what is found in nature.  How is it identical?  The iden-
iad); Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563, 610–14
(2012) (discussing the holding in Mayo).
14 For early evaluations, see Burk, supra note 7; Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the
Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111 (2013).
15 JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 601, 749 (6th ed. 2008).
16 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119–20.
17 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
18 Id. at 1328.
19 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118.
20 Justice Thomas has, alas, a history of authoring unfortunately reasoned patent opin-
ions. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 339–41 (4th ed. 2012)
(pointing out the clear doctrinal errors in Thomas’s opinion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)); Dan L. Burk, Legal Constraint of Genetic Use Restriction Technolo-
gies, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 335, 351–53 (2004) (pointing out the clear doctrinal errors
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tity between the native molecule and the extracted gDNA, he tells us, is
found in the coding information—never mind that the extracted molecule
has a different chemical structure than what one finds in the human chromo-
some.21  It is the nucleotide sequence that counts.
I have previously criticized the characterization that Thomas adopts here
of DNA as “information,”22 but, very well then, one would think—and the
petitioners certainly argued23—if the Court is going to adopt this rationale, it
should also preclude the Myriad patent claims drawn to the cDNA, since such
molecules code for exactly the same gene product as the gDNA.  Indeed, the
cDNAs are reverse transcribed from mRNA molecules produced in the cell
using the gDNA as a template.  But no, Justice Thomas tells us, the Myriad
cDNA is patent eligible because it is for subject matter purposes distinct from
what is found in nature.24  What is the distinction?  The distinction between
the native molecule and the cDNA is found in the structural difference
between the reverse transcribed molecule and what one finds in the human
chromosome.25  Because it was produced by a process of reverse transcrip-
tion, the cDNA lacks intervening nucleotide sequences or “introns” found in
the native gene—never mind that it carries the same coding information.26
It is the chemical structure that counts.
Reading Thomas’s opinion, one is therefore forced to conclude that
molecules that differ structurally from a native molecule are both excluded
from and included within patentable matter, while molecules with the same
coding information as a native molecule are also both excluded from and
included within patentable subject matter.  It is, in short, quite impossible to
logically determine from the opinion whether a given macromolecule meets
the criterion for patent eligibility.  The Patent Office initially adopted the
most simplistic reading of the case, instructing its examiners that extracted
genomic DNA is not patent eligible.27  But this reading gives no guidance as
in Thomas’s opinion in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001)).
21 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118.  The Court’s reasoning here is that a molecule compris-
ing an additional nucleotide residue beyond that claimed by Myriad would have a new
structure, but would infringe the Myriad patent. Id.  While the observation might be true,
it is irrelevant to the question of subject matter.  It is of course deeply disturbing that the
Court apparently cannot tell the difference between the question of subject matter and the
question of infringement.
22 See Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 588
(2006).




27 Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination
Policy, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps (June 13, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad_20130613.pdf.
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to the patent eligibility of a wide range of other molecules that may or may
not be precluded from § 10128 by the Myriad opinion’s reasoning.29
The problem is perhaps most starkly illustrated by a molecule known as
a peptide nucleic acid, or PNA.30  The molecule’s title is a bit of a misnomer,
as it is not a nucleic acid at all; it is rather a synthetically created polymer in
which the natural sugar-phosphate chain “backbone” of a nucleic acid is
replaced by peptide backbone, but maintains the same nucleotide side struc-
tures as found in a nucleic acid—in other words, the PNA combines features
of a protein and a nucleic acid.31  It is, therefore, an entirely artificial mole-
cule that would never occur in the wild, but which is capable of carrying the
same sequence information as a nucleic acid.
Consider a PNA with the nucleotide sequence from a particular gene,
such as BRCA1.  What could one tell a client about the patentability of such a
molecule?  The molecule is entirely a synthetic creation and would never be
synthesized by cells in the wild.  Thus, under the structural rationale of the
second half of the Myriad opinion, it seems to be patentable.  Certainly it
differs structurally from any naturally occurring molecule more than does a
cDNA molecule.  But at the same time, the PNA carries the same base
sequence information as the native gDNA molecule.  Thus, under the infor-
mational rationale of the first half of the Myriad opinion, it seems to fall
outside patentable subject matter.
This logical discontinuity throws into doubt the patent eligibility of a
wide range of macromolecules, not necessarily used in diagnostic testing, but
in a range of industries from chemical manufacturing to agriculture.  And
the mischief done by the opinion does not, of course, stop with
macromolecules.  Pharmaceutical and other chemical developers routinely
extract potentially useful organic molecules from a variety of native sources:
plants, microorganisms, sea creatures.  Antibiotics, cancer treatments, and
other medicinal substances are routinely discovered in this fashion.  Such
small molecules of course have no coding sequence as macromolecules do,
and they may or may not be structurally altered from what is found in the
wild.  Depending on whether one believes that structure or information is
the determining criterion in Myriad, it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to
fathom how Justice Thomas’s reasoning is to be applied to the patent eligibil-
ity of such novel chemicals.
28 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
29 At the time of this writing the PTO has issued a more recent guidance memoran-
dum—currently undergoing a period of public comment—that adopts a complicated
examination methodology and which would appear to apply a restrictive reading of Myriad
to a much broader range of molecules. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld,
Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent
Examining Corps (March 4, 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/
myriad-mayo_guidance.pdf.
30 See Peter E. Nielsen et al., Sequence-Selective Recognition of DNA by Strand Displacement
with a Thymine-Substituted Polyamide, 254 SCI. 1497 (1991); Pernilla Wittung et al., DNA-like
Double Helix Formed by Peptide Nucleic Acid, 368 NATURE 561 (1994).
31 See Nielsen et al., supra note 30, at 1497.
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Why then would the Court tender an opinion so entirely at odds with
itself?  Setting aside the very real possibility that the Court did not under-
stand what it was doing,32 the most plausible rationale is that the Court hesi-
tated to cordon off such molecules from the incentive structure of the
biotechnology industry.  For thirty years prior to the Myriad decision, the Pat-
ent Office treated purified macromolecules the way they treated other puri-
fied chemicals, as the non-natural product of human ingenuity.33  A robust
American biotechnology industry grew up around this policy.  Similar stan-
dards were adopted by the United States’ trading partners.34  The Supreme
Court has, in the past, chided lower courts for adopting new rules that dis-
rupt the settled expectations of patent holders.35  Overturning three decades
of consistent administrative practice would be fairly disruptive.
So it appears that the Supreme Court split the baby, giving something to
the plaintiffs but also reserving the possibility of cDNA patents for the bio-
technology industry.  However, it is worth remembering that “splitting the
baby” by no means implies a just or preferable outcome.  In the classic bibli-
cal story from which the term is derived, King Solomon threatened to split the
baby as an information-forcing strategy to resolve a dispute over
parenthood.36  Carrying out the threat was the last thing anyone wanted, and
would have been detrimental to all the parties—most especially to the baby.
It remains to be seen how detrimental the Myriad split will be to biotechnol-
ogy and related industries.
II. THE PRODUCTS OF NATURE DOCTRINE
The exclusion of gDNA from patentable subject matter has garnered
much of the attention directed to the Myriad decision; the inclusion of cDNA
less so.37  But the major holding of the Myriad case is perhaps not so much
that genomic DNA is probably, mostly, presumptively unpatentable, but
rather that patent law in fact has a discrete and operating product of nature
32 Notably, to the otherwise unanimous opinion, Justice Scalia addended a concur-
rence confessing that he neither understood the science involved in the case nor believed
that his colleagues did either.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
33 Id. at 2118–19 (majority opinion).
34 See, e.g., Council Directive 98/44/EC, art. 3(2), 1998 O.J. (L 213), 18 (“Biological
material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a techni-
cal process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature.”);
European Patent Convention, Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant
of European Patents, Rule 27(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended Dec. 9,
2004), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/r27
.html.
35 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002).
36 1 Kings 3:16–28.  I am grateful to Glynn Lunney for pointing this out.
37 See Dan L. Burk, What Media Missed About Gene Patent Case, CNN (June 14, 2013,
10:09 AM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/14/what-media-missed-ab
out-gene-patent-case/.
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doctrine.  We had all suspected that this was the case, given the frequent
repetition of Supreme Court dicta to this effect, but actual previous holdings
were dubious or absent.  Over the past thirty years, the Court’s subject matter
cases have all been cases about laws of nature rather than about products of
nature.  Nonetheless, these opinions have typically opened with a series of
stock citations, including a passage from the landmark Diamond v.
Chakrabarty opinion, stating that items such as a “new plant” or a “mineral
discovered in the earth” lie outside patentable subject matter.38
However, not only were such stock quotations dicta in the context of the
laws of nature opinions where they appeared, the original statement in
Chakrabarty was itself essentially dicta.  The Chakrabarty opinion concerned
the patent eligibility of a genetically modified bacterium, which was contro-
versial subject matter because it was alive.39  Despite an examiner’s initial,
indefensible rejection of claims to the bacterium as impermissibly drawn to a
product of nature,40 by the time the case reached the Supreme Court no one
seriously argued that Chakrabarty’s genetically altered bacterium was a prod-
uct of nature—manifestly it had been altered by human manipulation.41
Rather, the Court in that case used the oft-cited products of nature trope as a
foil to elaborate its argument that the proper distinction in patentable sub-
ject matter is between naturally and non-naturally occurring entities, not
between living and non-living entities.42  This allowed it to reject as irrelevant
the question of whether the patented invention was alive.
Similarly, the older cases that the Court relied upon in Chakrabarty, and
then subsequently for product of nature citations, were not in fact subject
matter cases, but rather, cases about invention—what would now be called
obviousness cases, or in some instances, novelty cases.43  For example,
although an aphorism about phenomena of nature has become the most
enduring legacy of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,44 the case as
decided was not about products of nature.  Funk Bros. concerned a mixture of
six nitrogen-fixing bacteria that could be beneficially used by farmers to pop-
ulate the root nodules of certain agricultural crops such as legumes.45  Prior
38 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
39 See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed,
17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 1, 30 (1991).
40 In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
41 See infra text accompanying notes 124–31.
42 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313 (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction
was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether
living or not, and human-made inventions.”).  Justice Brennan’s dissent adopts the same
logic in refuting the majority’s argument on legislative intent. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
43 See Dan Burk, The “Runcible” Product of Nature Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 4, 2013,
3:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/the-runcible-product-of-nature-doctrine/
(“Those [previous] cases addressed the judicially created concept of ‘invention,’ which we
know today as distinct statutory requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.”).
44 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
45 Id. at 128–29.
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to the patentee’s mixed inoculant product, the bacteria had been sold sepa-
rately, and indeed it was believed that they must be used separately because
they would inhibit one another.46  The case was rather clearly a decision
about invention, and whether the combination of the three bacterial strains
in a single inoculum constituted an invention.  It is clear from the opinion
that the Court regarded the patentee’s invention as a more convenient form
of packaging, and that it did not consider better packaging to reach the
required level of inventiveness.47
The question of invention, rather than nature, was similarly at issue in
the oft-cited American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.48  There the particular
question was whether citrus fruit, having its rind impregnated with borax to
prevent mold spoilage, constituted a “manufacture” under the subject matter
clause of the then-current patent statute.49  The Court reasoned that the
treated fruit was insufficiently altered to constitute a “manufacture,” and held
forth at some length regarding the unchanged character of the fruit and of
the borax, just as it would later in Funk Bros. regarding the unchanged nature
of the nitrogen-fixing bacteria.50  The fruit may indeed still have been fruit,
and coating fruit with borax may be what we would now call obvious given
the known characteristics of borax.  But the holding was not one regarding
products of nature—it seems clear that citrus fruit in its natural state is decid-
edly free of borax; there is no question that borax-treated fruit is a human-
generated artifact.
At the same time, whatever such cases originally meant or perhaps now
should mean, the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon them to justify
and shore up the products of nature concept.  Throughout its cases on sub-
ject matter, the Court has in particular “retconned”51 Funk Bros. as the go-to
citation for the Chakrabarty dicta on products of nature.  In Myriad, Justice
Thomas reviews Funk Bros. at some length, concluding that the treatment of
the Funk bacterial inoculum serves as squarely analogous precedent for the
treatment of Myriad’s genomic sequence.52  Thus, notwithstanding its actual
holding, the case seems to have undergone hindsight reconstruction as a
decision about the patentability of natural products.  Thomas uses this to
provide a veneer of precedent for the Court’s holding on gene patents.
46 Id. at 129.
47 Id. at 131 (“But we think that that aggregation of species fell short of invention
within the meaning of the patent statutes.”).
48 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
49 Id. at 6.
50 Id. at 11–12.
51 See Retcon, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/retcon?s=t
(last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“[Abbreviation of] retroactive continuity.  The common situa-
tion in fiction where a new story ‘reveals’ things about events in previous stories, usually
leaving the ‘facts’ the same (thus preserving continuity) while completely changing their
interpretation.”).
52 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013).
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III. THE LAWS OF NATURE DOCTRINE
As Myriad constitutes the first Supreme Court case since the codification
of the obviousness doctrine to squarely hold that a claimed material is unpat-
entable as a product of nature, much of the authority for the decision comes
not from repurposed obviousness holdings, but from the subject matter line
of cases dealing with laws of nature.  The most recent of those opinions prior
to Myriad is the Mayo opinion, and so reference to Mayo is not utterly absent
from Myriad, at least not as citations go.  The Court’s analysis in Myriad in
fact begins with a quotation from the Mayo opinion, that “ ‘[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’”53
Later on in the same paragraph, Thomas quotes the usual dicta we have
already described from Diamond v. Chakrabarty regarding the exclusion of
natural products from patentable subject matter, moving in the space of a
single paragraph, without explanation, from citation of authority excluding
natural principles from patentable subject matter, to citation of authority
excluding natural products from patentable subject matter.54  The shift from
excluded principles to excluded products takes place within the space of a
few words and seems to elide any distinction between the two categories.
Thus, one very real but troubling explanation for the Supreme Court’s
silence on the relationship between laws of nature and products of nature is
that the Justices perhaps cannot see any distinction between the two.  In Myr-
iad, Justice Thomas characterizes the bacterial inoculum from Funk Bros. as
falling squarely within the “laws of nature”—and not “products of nature”—
exception, as he says do the genetic claims in the Myriad patents.55  But this
conversion is not original to Justice Thomas.  The full passage that he relies
upon from Chakrabarty makes a similar categorical juxtaposition, jumping
from principles to products and back again:
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held
not patentable.  Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.  Likewise, Einstein could
not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented
the law of gravity.56
One might attempt to cure the disjunction in this passage by assuming
that “minerals” and “plants” constitute “physical phenomena,” placing them
alongside “laws of nature” and “abstract ideas” in the introductory sen-
tence.57  This reading would not cure the problematic confusion of products
and processes, but it at least relates the sentences of the passage together.
However, this usage would not be the usual meaning of the word phenome-
53 Id. at 2116 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293 (2012)).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2117–18.
56 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted).
57 Indeed, Professor Strandburg appears to have made precisely this assumption. See
Strandburg, supra note 13, at 586–614.
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non, which commonly refers to observable “fact[s], occurrence[s], or circum-
stance[s].”58  The occurrence of a mineral in the earth may constitute a
phenomenon of nature—it was not buried or formed there by human
agency—but the mineral itself is an object or substance, not a phenomenon.
Neither would this reading be consistent with the Court’s prior usage of
the term in similar discussions; for example in the decision regarding laws of
nature in Parker v. Flook, where Justice Stevens treats “phenomena” as synony-
mous with “process”: “[t]he rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot
be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not
processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are
not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”59  Thus
plants and minerals may not be phenomena, but phenomena, ideas, laws,
minerals, and plants are all seemingly treated by the Supreme Court as
equivalent within the category of the “natural.”  Natural products and natural
laws are left undifferentiated.  As if to cement this amalgamation, Thomas in
Myriad goes on to discuss both categories as “naturally occurring things,”60
reifying, or as the saying goes “thingifying,” natural principles into objects
alongside natural products.61
Language from the earlier Funk Bros. opinion also lends itself to collaps-
ing product into principle.  Despite the Court’s acknowledgement in Funk
Bros. that in the disputed inoculum patent “[w]e have here only product
claims,”62 the opinion by Justice Douglas then focuses entirely on the qualities
or traits of the bacteria in the claimed mixture as manifestations of the laws
of nature:
Their qualities are the work of nature.  Those qualities are of course not
patentable.  For patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of
nature.  The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity,
or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men.  They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.  He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of
nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.  If there is
to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of
the law of nature to a new and useful end.63
Much the same logic is apparent in the other pre-1952 invention cases
that the Court has relied upon in string citations to support the product of
nature doctrine, such as American Fruit Growers.  There the Court similarly
reasoned that the product was patent ineligible because the borax protec-
58 Phenomenon, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/phenome
non?s=t (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
59 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
60 Myriad, 133 S. Ct at 2116 (emphasis added).
61 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (discussing the “‘thingification’ of property”); Michael J. Madison,
Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 401 (2005)
(discussing “thingification” of legal concepts).
62 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
63 Id. (citation omitted).
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tively coating the rinds of citrus fruit was simply exerting its natural
characteristics.64
The logic of such assertions is more than a little puzzling if taken as a
statement about the metric for recognizing products of nature.  The Court in
these cases considers the components of the claimed inventions piecemeal,
rather than as a whole.  When any human creation is considered as an amal-
gamation of its initial components, they will not surprisingly be found to
exhibit merely their natural properties.  At some level, such qualities or
attributes may be said to constitute “laws” or “principles” or “phenomena” of
nature—they are the recurring, observed characteristics of materials behav-
ing in accordance with the observations of physics or chemistry.
But all materials incorporated into human artifacts exhibit such intrinsic
characteristics—the silicon incorporated into window panes or semiconduc-
tor chips exhibits exactly the same qualities or attributes as that found in the
wild; the steel incorporated into automobile chassis or cutlery behaves exactly
like steel.  Indeed it is the very qualities or attributes inherent in the material
that make it useful in those applications.  Neither on this logic is it possible
for humans to alter a substance’s “natural” characteristics, since any altera-
tion itself follows natural principles and is by definition a natural characteris-
tic of the newly modified substance.
Nor does this logic seem to map onto the subject matter actually at issue
in the patents considered in such cases.  Product patents typically do not
attempt to claim the qualities of a particular material; they rather claim a
material that has particular qualities.  The qualities may well be used to
describe the material claimed, but this is not a claim to the qualities.  Adopt-
ing Justice Stevens’s Funk Bros. example of “the qualities of metals,”65 it
would be peculiar to find a patent that claimed as its invention “conductivity
of 4.23 siemens,” or “resistance of 2.45 ohms” or “ductility of 18% elonga-
tion.”  The claims to a new metal might well use conductivity, resistance, and
percentage elongation to describe a substance claimed, but this is not a claim
to those qualities.66
Certainly the claims at issue in Funk Bros. or American Fruit Growers
claimed no qualities, but rather physical materials, even though the qualities
of the materials were the focus of the Court’s discussion.  This seeming pecu-
liarity of these cases, focusing on the characteristics or qualities of physical
materials, seems largely an artifact of reconstructing the inventiveness cases
after the fact as establishing a product of nature doctrine.  The Court in cases
such as Funk Bros. was assaying the claims for invention, and took the quali-
ties of the material as a measure of obviousness or “inventive step” rather
than as a measure of patent eligibility.  Thus, in the analysis of those cases,
64 Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1931).
65 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
66 Such claims would also certainly and properly fail the abstract ideas criterion, not to
mention they would be impossible to support in the specification. See infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
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deeming the qualities or attributes of the bacteria to be unchanged from their
native state signals a lack of inventiveness.
This metric might make sense in the context of our current § 103,67 but
it makes far less sense in the context of our current § 101, and absolutely no
sense in the case of the Myriad nucleotide sequences.  As Judge Moore noted
in her concurring opinion to the Federal Circuit decision, the qualities of the
isolated nucleotide sequences are decidedly different from those found in
the cell.68  Judge Moore’s metric for patent eligibility was the new uses to
which the claimed Myriad molecules could be put—the isolated nucleotide
structures could be used for genetic testing, or as primers or probes, while
the native cellular structures could not be due to being embedded within the
millions of bases of a human chromosome.69
What then is the quality or attribute that Justice Thomas appears to see,
that like the “unchanged” qualities of the Funk Bros. bacteria is shared
between the chromosomal nucleotide sequence and the extracted nucleotide
sequence?  It seems to be just that—the nucleotide sequence itself.  He
emphasizes that this attribute has not been added to or altered by Myriad in
extracting their claimed molecules from the chromosome.70  As Judge Lou-
rie correctly pointed out in the Federal Circuit opinion below, this view of
the claims ignores the differences between the native and isolated molecules
to focus instead on a particular similarity.71  What Thomas’s opinion lacks—
among other failings—is a coherent theory as to why the differences in cer-
tain molecular characteristics should be overlooked in favor of the similari-
ties in other characteristics.
One might argue that gDNA merits different treatment on the theory
that genetic sequences embody process information—that is, the coding
sequence that Thomas relies upon in the first part of the Myriad opinion
serves as a template or guide for the processes of transcription to mRNA and
translation to proteins.  In other words, as an “informational” molecule, a
given gDNA embodies the process that leads to its gene product.  This view
shifts the emphasis from whether the problem with patenting nucleotide
sequences stems from their occurrence in nature, like a “mineral in the
earth,” to whether it might rather stem from their embodiment of a natural
principle or phenomenon in the same vein as the metabolic correlation in
Mayo.
This take on the opinion would certainly be consistent with how the trial
court in Myriad viewed the question, although the trial court opinion is far
more consistent on this point than the Supreme Court seems to have been.
In the trial court opinion, Judge Sweet rejected Myriad’s genomic DNA
claims as drawn to unpatentable products of nature, however—inverting the
67 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
68 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 1342.
70 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
71 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1330.
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logic ultimately adopted by Justice Thomas in the Supreme Court’s opinion;
he likewise rejected Myriad’s cDNA claims as drawn to unpatentable subject
matter, because they contained the same informational content as the native
gDNA molecules.72  Judge Sweet explicitly looked to Funk Bros.’ reasoning
that the coding information shared by both genomic and complementary
DNA molecules is a natural principle or phenomenon.73
This approach in essence converts the product of nature issue into a law
of nature issue, at least for DNA molecules.  But this sort of argument proves
too much, as all chemical entities embody information in the thermody-
namic sense, and biological molecules in particular embody process informa-
tion in their specific spatial configurations.74  Thus even were the
“informational molecule”75 characterization correct, it would not supply a
satisfactory general theory for other products of nature.  Somehow cabining
the rationale to only DNA or other macromolecules might exclude isolated
small-molecule substances from the more pernicious practical effects of the
Myriad rule, but would fail to explain the Myriad holding on cDNA.
A. The Nature of Natural Law
Implicit in this juxtaposition of natural principles and natural products
is a rationale of physical immanence, an assumption that natural laws or phe-
nomena are embedded in the fabric of the universe, waiting for human dis-
covery, as would be a mineral or substance found in the earth.  In the
germinal subject matter decision Gottschalk v. Benson,76 which launched the
Supreme Court’s patent eligibility odyssey,77 the Court extended this ratio-
nale to mathematics.78  Designating mathematics as an a priori component
of reality constitutes a highly questionable assumption, as there is a very
strong argument to be made that mathematics is not inherent in the uni-
verse, but is rather a human language created by humans to describe the
universe.79  But this caveat applies equally well to natural laws or principles
that are typically expressed in mathematical form; far from existing outside
72 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
73 Id.
74 Burk, supra note 22, at 585–88.  Judge Sweet explicitly rejected this argument, offer-
ing the bizarrely teleological rationale that DNA uniquely informs the structure of other
molecules. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 229.  This kind of supposition is
only possible by conceptually divorcing the molecule from the system in which it operates,
Burk, supra note 22, at 583–84, which ironically parallels the physical basis for Myriad’s
claims to an isolated and purified nucleotide fragment removed from its cellular context.
75 Burk, supra note 22, at 587.
76 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
77 I note that Odysseus was said to have been lost for only ten years; the Supreme
Court has been wandering for nearly thirty. See Bernard Knox, Introduction to HOMER, THE
ODYSSEY 3, 3 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996) (stating that Odysseus wandered for ten years).
78 Benson, 409 U.S. at 72–73.
79 Dan L. Burk, Patent Law’s Problem Children: Software and Biotechnology in Transatlantic
Context, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 187, 197 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bag-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-DEC-14 16:22
518 notre dame law review [vol. 90:2
of human experience, they might better be viewed as human expressions
describing the causal order of materiality.
Thus, the Supreme Court is fond of saying that neither Einstein nor
Newton could patent their famous formulations of physics because they con-
stitute principles of nature.80  But both formulations show every sign of being
the product of human ingenuity.  We know, for example, that Newton’s for-
mulae are in some sense wrong, or are at best incomplete.  They are gross
approximations of physical causality that work relatively well at the scale of
everyday physical interactions, because the inaccuracies at that scale are small
enough not to be readily measured or particularly inconvenient to macro-
scopic predictions.  However, they break down at the atomic level and must
be replaced by a different set of quantum mechanical formulae that are capa-
ble of predicting the behavior of matter at that scale.81  Quantum calcula-
tions yield accurate and workable results at the macroscopic level, too,
although at a level of precision not really necessary for everyday activity.82
Probably we will find out some day that our quantum mechanical descrip-
tions of matter are equally mistaken—we just have not discovered it yet.  So
far these quantum formulae seem fairly robust, but we must suppose that at
some point in the future they may well yield to some better and more accu-
rate mathematical description, just as Newton’s did in the early twentieth
century.
The history of science is littered with such models that were useful for a
time but which were eventually superseded: Bohr’s atom,83 Kepler’s solar sys-
tem,84 Euclid’s geometry.85  Each was peculiar to the inventive imagination
of its author, although not entirely peculiar.  Absent a descent into utter sol-
ipsism, we expect to find some extrinsic constraint on the vision articulated
by the scientist.  We may see through the glass of science darkly, but we
assume there remains a causality to perceive.  As Karen Barad puts it, “the
world kicks back.”86  Matter still matters,87 so that the scientific model is not
ley eds., 2014); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
371, 406 (2005) (noting this assumption in the laws of nature doctrine).
80 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
81 See PETER ATKINS & JULIO DE PAULA, ATKINS’ PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 244–72 (8th ed.
2006).
82 See J. REX GOATES ET AL., GENERAL CHEMISTRY 377 (1981) (calculating the deBroglie
wavelength of bullets and race horses as well as neutrons in a problem).
83 Id. at 374 (noting that Bohr’s “solar system model” of the atom proved
unworkable).
84 Kepler spent much of his life futilely attempting to get his model of the solar system
to fit the musical scale or the geometry of regular solids. See J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND
HUMAN VALUES 12 (rev. ed. 1965).
85 See MICHAEL GUILLEN, BRIDGES TO INFINITY 110 (1983).
86 Karen Barad, Agential Realism: Feminist Interventions in Understanding Scientific Prac-
tices, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 1, 2 (Mario Biagioli ed., 1999).
87 See Karen Barad, Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter
Comes to Matter, 28 SIGNS 801, 803 (2003) (arguing that matter is still an “active participant
in the world’s becoming”).
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wholly the figment of the human imagination.  But this realization puts the
formulae of a Newton or Einstein into the same category as all other human
inventions that the Supreme Court recognizes “at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.”88  A Newton or an Einstein constructs a model that entails the quali-
ties or characteristics of the universe but is not a quality or characteristic of
the universe.
The fact that a model such as Newton’s very persistent and very useful
formulations of physical law turn out to be incorrect is neither an indictment
of Newton nor of science; it is simply an example of how science works and of
how it is supposed to work.  It may however constitute an indictment of pat-
ent doctrine, as Newton’s failures demonstrate the human inventiveness of
such expressions of natural law.  Newton’s laws are not discoveries of princi-
ples somehow embedded in physical reality; they are rather mistaken or
incomplete human descriptions of observed phenomena, which work well
enough for macroscopic human endeavor, but which are not in fact accu-
rately descriptive of how matter is actually behaving.89  Like a book, poem, or
other expressive statement, Newton’s scientific concepts bear the imprint of
the mind that formulated them and of the society that produced them; they
are only wrong insofar as they are superseded by the formulation of a differ-
ent author incorporating a different viewpoint.90
Since laws of nature are fairly obviously the product of human ingenuity,
we are left with the question of exactly why we have such an exclusion from
patent eligibility when the American patent statute has been held to encom-
pass “anything under the sun that is made by man[kind].”91  Certainly the
exclusion is not required by the explicit terms of the statute.  As the Court
admits, the product of nature doctrine itself, let alone any justification for its
existence, is entirely judicial gloss on what is otherwise a fairly straightforward
statute.92  And as Judge Giles Rich pointed out long ago, were one to follow
the plain meaning of § 101, we could very quickly see whether the claimed
invention constituted a process, machine, composition, or manufacture, and
then move on.93
To the extent that there may be any statutory hook on which to hang the
doctrine, it might be found in § 101’s requirement that the invention be
“new”—products or principles drawn unaltered from nature might be con-
sidered new under some meanings of that term.  But the Court long ago
rejected that reading of the statute, stating that “newness” in § 101 means
neither more nor less than “novelty” as encompassed in § 102,94 and the for-
88 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
89 See ATKINS & DE PAULA, supra note 81, at 240.
90 See J. BRONOWSKI, THE COMMON SENSE OF SCIENCE 37–38 (1951).
91 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at
5 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
93 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
94 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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mer is merely a reference to the latter.95  And even had the Court adopted a
different stance, a “newness” criterion would not necessarily solve the prob-
lem under consideration here—since nothing is drawn from nature unal-
tered by humans, and is always “new” to humankind at its first discovery.
There is, in short, no solace to be drawn from the statute; since the doctrine
was wholly created by Court, its meaning must be supplied by Court.
Summing up to this point, the Court is insistent that there is a non-
statutory products of nature exception to patentable subject matter, and that
it is related to the more frequently articulated laws of nature doctrine—
indeed, Justice Thomas seems to find the two indistinguishable.  So it is there
that we must look to understand how Myriad fits into the rationale the
Supreme Court has built around § 101.  But the laws of nature doctrine itself
seems largely incoherent, having little to do with “nature,” and instead prima-
rily addresses human concepts.  Perhaps this should not be surprising, how-
ever.  Somewhat ironically, prior to Mayo, the cases in which the Supreme
Court has elaborated on “laws of nature” are almost entirely those reviewing
the patent eligibility of what would seem to be the inarguably human artifact
of computer software.  And yet software provides the setting that takes us a
step nearer to understanding how the Myriad case might be considered in
light of the Mayo decision.
B. The Strangest Feeling of De´ja` vu
When it comes to patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court, much
like Lewis Carroll’s Bellman, seems to express itself in threes.96  In the 1970s
the Court produced in rapid succession a trilogy of consecutive, though not
entirely coherent, opinions on the patent eligibility of computer software, in
which the Court attempted to define the parameters of patentable subject
matter exclusions.  In the earliest of these opinions, Gottschalk v. Benson,97
the Court declared unpatentable a process for transforming one type of
numerical notation into another.98  The Court found the claims to read on a
mathematical relationship that constituted a law or principle of nature, plac-
ing it outside patentable subject matter, and which the Court found
unpatentably abstract to boot.99  In the second opinion, Parker v. Flook,100 the
Court similarly invalidated claims to a method of calculating an “alarm limit,”
which is to say a method of measuring and determining whether the state of
an industrial chemical process was approaching a point of danger.101
95 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 (1981) (“Section 101 . . . is a general state-
ment of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection. . . . Specific condi-
tions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty.”).
96 LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK at fit 1, stanza 2 (Chatto & Windus
1941) (1876) (“‘What I tell you three times is true.’”).
97 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
98 Id. at 72–73.
99 Id. at 68.
100 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
101 Id. at 585, 594, 596.
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In a third case, Diamond v. Diehr,102 the Court seemingly reversed course,
finding patent eligibility on facts surprisingly similar to those in Flook.103  In
Diehr, the Court held claims to a method for calculating an industrial process
parameter, using a standard chemical formula, to be patentable.104  The
automated calculation was used to judge the completion of a curing process
for synthetic rubber used to produce output such as automobile tires.105
This seems to be the only appreciable difference between the cases: in Flook,
as in Benson, the Supreme Court took the end product to be a number,
whereas in Diehr it took the end product to be a tire.  The opinion empha-
sizes the materiality and tangibility of the Diehr process as opposed to the
immateriality and abstraction of the Flook process.106
In the early twenty-first century the Court now seems to have produced a
companion trilogy on subject matter, returning first to the question of
software patentability in Bilski v. Kappos,107 then turning to laws of nature in
Mayo v. Prometheus,108 and finally back to computer programs with the recent
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.109  The decision in the first
installment of this contemporary subject matter trilogy, Bilski v. Kappos, revis-
ited the questions regarding software and mathematical processes addressed
in the Benson opinion nearly forty years before.110  The claims in the Bilski
case concerned a “business method” for hedging financial investments,
expressed as a particular mathematical formula.111  Much as in Benson, the
claims to the method might most usually be implemented in a computer, but
were not explicitly limited to such implementation.  Whereas a divided Fed-
eral Circuit had held the claims were not patent eligible because they were
neither limited to embodiment in a machine, nor to a particular material
transformation, the Supreme Court excluded the claims from patentable sub-
ject matter as an illegitimate attempt to claim an abstract idea.112  In doing
so, the Court held that characterizing the invention as a machine or transfor-
mation of matter may be a relevant consideration, but not the sole determi-
nant of patent eligibility under § 101.113
Close on the heels of its Bilski opinion, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court
took up the limits of patents directed to laws or principles of nature.114
Much as in the earlier Parker v. Flook, which the Mayo opinion references with
102 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
103 Id. at 177–81, 184.
104 Id. at 177–78, 192–93.
105 Id. at 177–78.
106 Id. at 186–87.
107 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
108 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
109 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2013).
110 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1351–52 (2011).
111 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611–12.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 3227–28.
114 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
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some regularity,115 the Court rejected a set of diagnostic method claims as
reading on unpatentable natural phenomena.116  The Mayo claims were
directed to a course of medical treatment: administering to a patient a partic-
ular pharmaceutical, determining the level of the pharmaceutical metabo-
lites in the patient’s blood, and then raising or lowering the dosage to an
effective level.117  In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court reversed the
Federal Circuit’s conclusion that this was a patent eligible application of nat-
ural principles, holding that the claims were directed to natural principles
themselves.118  While the Federal Circuit saw in the metabolism of the drug a
tangible transformation of matter, the Supreme Court only saw the natural
activity of the human liver, producing a characteristic level of metabolic
products.119  Measuring the level of such metabolites, and administering
therapeutically effective dosages of the drug, was characterized as routine or
conventional activity that was insufficient to transform an unpatentable natu-
ral correlation into a patentable invention.120
It is this holding that is so strangely disconnected from the succeeding
products of nature holding in AMP v. Myriad.121  Yet there is odd precedent
for the Court’s silence.  During the run of software patent opinions thirty
years ago, in which the Court formulated the laws of nature doctrine in its
current incarnation, the Supreme Court also ventured for the first time into
the biotechnology field.  Much as the current Court has addressed Myriad’s
product of nature issue between Mayo and Alice Corp., the Court thirty years
ago generated a subject matter opinion on genetically engineered orga-
nisms—Diamond v. Chakrabarty—between its second and third process patent
decisions.122  In some senses Chakrabarty might be considered the fourth
opinion in the Court’s twentieth-century software trilogy.123  The decision
has become famous for its expansive view that all new technologies are pre-
sumptively patentable subject matter unless there is a clear signal from Con-
gress to the contrary.124  The case’s oft-cited trope is that American patent
law is intended to extend to “anything under the sun” made by a human.125
But this also implies the contrapositive: that American patent law does not
115 See id. at 1294, 1298, 1299, 1301, 1303 (referencing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978)).
116 Id. at 1294.
117 Id. at 1296–97.
118 Id. at 1299–1300.
119 Id. at 1296, 1298.
120 Id.
121 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
122 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
123 Cf. DOUGLAS ADAMS, SO LONG, AND THANKS FOR ALL THE FISH (1984)(the fourth
book in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy trilogy).
124 See Dan L. Burk, Reflections in a Darkling Glass: A Comparative Contemplation of the
Harvard College Decision, 39 CAN. BUS. L.J. 219, 229 (2003) (“Chakrabarty assumes that the
door is open and it is up to Congress to shut it . . . .”).
125 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)).
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extend to things under the sun not made by humans,126 which leads in turn
to the subject matter inquiry as to what is and is not considered made by
humans.
But that inquiry was not taken up in Chakrabarty.  Instead, as I have
already indicated, the Chakrabarty opinion dealt with the problem of suitabil-
ity of patents for living organisms.127  Although the patent examiner had ini-
tially rejected the Chakrabarty application, as well as the application in the
companion case, In re Bergy,128 as drawn to non-statutory products of nature,
this position was rejected by the Patent Office’s internal review board.129
The Patent Office’s alternate and preferred rationale for denying the claims
shifted to a patent ineligibility rejection for being drawn to living subject mat-
ter.130  This is the issue that was twice reviewed by the intermediate Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.131  By the time the cases reached final review by
the Supreme Court, the issue properly before the Court was the patent eligi-
bility of living organisms, not of natural products.
Yet the Court at the time clearly viewed the Chakrabarty subject matter
issue as closely related, perhaps identical, to the laws of nature question
addressed in its contemporary software cases.  Indeed, the procedural posi-
tioning of the Chakrabarty opinion eerily presaged that of the more recent
Myriad opinion.  After certiorari was granted in Chakrabarty, the case was
remanded to the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court of appeals for reconsid-
eration in light of Parker v. Flook,132 much in the same way that Myriad was
later to be remanded for reconsideration in light of Mayo v. Prometheus.133
Just as the current Supreme Court saw some doctrinal connection between
Myriad and Mayo, the Court thirty years ago apparently saw some doctrinal
connection between Chakrabarty and Flook.
And, much as the connection between the Myriad and Mayo seems to
have evaporated after remand to the present-day Federal Circuit, the connec-
tion between Chakrabarty and Flook escaped the 1980s Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.  Judge Rich, writing for the intermediate appellate court
126 See Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 92, 94 (2013).
127 See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
128 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
129 In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1032–34 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
130 Professor Swanson suggests that this was a very calculated political move on the part
of the Patent Office in order to avoid the social controversy attending genetic engineering
technology. See Kara W. Swanson, Patents, Politics and Abortion, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN CONTEXT (William T. Gallagher & Debora J. Halbert eds., forthcoming), (manu-
script at 20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2337062
(discussing the agency practice of “avoiding issuing patents to deeply contentious technol-
ogies” in order to avoid controversy).
131 See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 955 (discussing intervening events since the first
decision).
132 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
133 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012)
(mem.) (order granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding).
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panel, rather bluntly pronounced Parker v. Flook inapposite to the question of
patenting living organisms.134  He then proceeded to instruct the higher
Court on the distinctions between patent eligible subject matter and the pat-
entability requirements of novelty and obviousness, which in his view the
Court had improperly muddied in Flook.135  A majority of the Supreme Court
appeared to take the criticism to heart, explicitly disavowing and limiting the
reasoning of Flook in the later Diehr opinion.136
Thirty years later in the remand of Myriad, all of the Federal Circuit
judges on remand gave at least lip service to the direction to reconsider Myr-
iad in light of Mayo, with differing degrees of solicitude for the applicability
of Mayo.  Judge Lourie, while diplomatically conceding that Mayo “illumi-
nate[s] broad . . . principles” regarding § 101,137 flatly concluded, notwith-
standing the instruction for reconsideration, that “a composition of matter is
not a law of nature.”138  Judge Moore gave a somewhat more sympathetic
reading to the equation of products and principles, opining that Mayo v.
Prometheus, while not controlling, was instructive because “the Prometheus dis-
cussion of laws of nature (process claims) clearly ought to apply equally to
manifestations of nature (composition claims).”139  And Judge Bryson in dis-
sent, while conceding that Mayo “does not decide this case,” attempted a type
of analogy between the issues raised in the two cases, suggesting that just as a
patentable invention involving a principle of nature must do more than sim-
ply describe the principle, so a patentable invention involving a product of
nature must do more than make incidental changes to the product.140
The differing opinions of the Federal Circuit judges offer a plausible
spectrum of rationales for the otherwise unexplained remand of Myriad.
Thirty years ago the remand of Chakrabarty produced only a flat intermediate
appellate rejection of any connection to Flook, a position that the Supreme
Court subsequently embraced.141  That bit of history seems not to have
repeated itself; the Court’s most recent software decision in Alice Corp., the
modern doppelganger to Diamond v. Diehr, relies heavily on citations to the
Mayo opinion and perhaps gives new legitimacy to Flook.142  But Alice Corp.,
134 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 964–65.
135 Id. at 959.
136 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981).
137 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
138 Id. at 1331.
139 Id. at 1339–40 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
140 Id. at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12; see also Dan L. Burk, Anticipating Patentable Subject
Matter, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 112–13 (2013) (discussing the rejection of the Flook
prior art analysis).
142 Both the Mayo and Alice Corp. opinions cite Parker v. Flook with some frequency, and
with apparent approval. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355, 2359, 2360
(2014) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1291, 1293, 1294, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1303
(2012) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
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while firmly tying its analysis to Mayo, says nothing substantive about Myriad,
and nothing that would connect Myriad to its other contemporary subject
matter cases.  By saying nothing thus far about the Mayo connection, the
Supreme Court has to some extent given the judges of the Federal Circuit
the last word on the meaning of Mayo for the Myriad patents.  Although the
Supreme Court neither rejected nor adopted any of the three Federal Circuit
views, they remain the likeliest set of possibilities as to what unarticulated
connection was originally seen by the Justices considering Chakrabarty and
Myriad.
IV. ABSTRACT IDEAS AND THE LIKE
The line of subject matter cases that begins with Gottschalk v. Benson
encompasses not only the exclusion of natural laws from patentable subject
matter, but a string of related exclusions for abstract ideas, mental steps, and
symbolic indicia.143  The mathematical transformations in Benson may have
failed patent eligibility as principles of nature, but could just as well have
been excluded because they were abstract ideas, or because the claims read
on mental processes, or because they were expressed as written matter
outside the purview of the patent system.  The more recent claims in Bilski,
Mayo, and Alice Corp. similarly implicate multiple subject matter exclusions.
Bilski might be said to address business methods, Mayo to address natural
laws, and Alice Corp. to address abstract ideas, but in fact it is impossible to
cleanly sort the opinions by the type of exclusion; each of these opinions to a
greater or lesser extent relies on the exclusions addressed in the others.
These doctrines of course travel as a pack: claims that are too abstract
are likely to read so broadly as to encompass principles of nature; claims that
encompass purely mental processes are likely too abstract; claims that encom-
pass mental processes are likely to read on written matter.  If it seems nearly
impossible to tell in a case like Benson or Bilski exactly which of these doc-
trines the Court is relying upon to reject a patent, it is because only the slight-
est conceptual reframing is necessary to turn the opinion from an abstract
ideas case to a mental steps or to a principle of nature case and back again.
Thus, Mayo might be a case about a natural diagnostic correlation, or it
might be a case about an invention that is too abstract.  Or it may very well be
a case about both.144
At the same time, although these doctrinal categories certainly overlap
and seem to offer a tantalizing commonality of character, that commonality
is in practice very difficult to discern.  The European Patent Office (EPO),
faced with a similar list of patentable subject matter exclusions in the Euro-
pean Patent Convention (EPC) that animates that Office, attempted to
143 See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 137–46 (2000).
144 Compare Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (“Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of
nature . . . .”), with id. at 1297 (holding that the process step of administering was insuffi-
cient to overcome the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas” (quoting Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 561 U.S. 593, 610 (2010))).
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divine some common principle among them.  The EPC, paralleling Ameri-
can common law, specifically excludes from patentable subject matter discov-
eries, scientific theories and mathematical methods, aesthetic creations, rules
and methods for performing mental acts, for playing games or for doing bus-
iness, programs for computers, and presentations of information.145  These
specific exclusions seem hauntingly similar in some way, and determining
their underlying logic would aid in applying them to borderline cases such as
software.
Unfortunately, the conclusion reached by the EPO on doctrinal com-
monality probably obscured rather than clarified the range of permissible
subject matter.  The Office concluded that the common feature among these
exclusions is that they are not “technical,”146 a term which has caused no end
of trouble in European patenting ever since, as the EPO and national courts
expended enormous effort in an ongoing futile pursuit of content for that
term.147  The past thirty years of EPC subject matter jurisprudence have been
characterized by a series of shifts in approach and emphasis, from searching
for the invention’s “technical character” to searching for its “technical contri-
bution,” to seemingly abandoning the entire enterprise.148  The more recent
EPC decisions on this topic seem to have concluded that recitation of any
physical apparatus is sufficient to render claims technical,149 and the work of
weeding out the dubious ones can be left to other doctrines such as novelty
or inventive step, which Americans would call non-obviousness.150  That out-
come is instructive, not only for the explicit list of exclusions in the EPC, but
for the parallel doctrines inferred under the American § 101.
A. Products and Processes
While the EPO has developed its subject matter jurisprudence from cate-
gories explicit in the EPC, in the United States much of the distinction
between the doctrinal exposition that culminates in Mayo and which begins
in Myriad arises from distinctions that are only implicit in our patent statute.
Section 101 of the U.S. patent statute defines patentable subject matter as
new and useful processes, machines, compositions of matter, or articles of
145 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), art.
52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://www
.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar52.html.
146 See Estimating Sales Activity/Duns Licensing Assocs., Case T 154/04, 2/2008 O.J.
E.P.O. 46, 61, 64 (Tech. Bd. App. 2006), available at http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj0
08/02_08/02_0468.pdf (“Article 52(2) EPC covers subjects whose common feature is a
substantial lack of technical character.”).
147 See Rosa Maria Ballardini, Software Patents in Europe: The Technical Requirement
Dilemma, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 563, 567–68 (2008).
148 Id.; Erika Ellyne, Patent Eligibility—the ‘Sick-Man’ of Patent Law, in ACCESS TO INFOR-
MATION AND KNOWLEDGE 139, 153–54 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2013).
149 See Ballardini, supra note 147, at 568.
150 See Burk, supra note 7, at 748.
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manufacture.151  One of these things, as children’s television might musically
advise us, is not like the others.152  Machines, compositions, and manufac-
tures, which as a group constitute the subject matter of product patents, are
(usually) tangible and discrete entities.  But the fourth category of statutory
subject matter, which constitutes the separate class of process patents, is not
made up of tangible entities, but is rather characterized by sets of relation-
ships between tangible entities.
At the same time, § 112(a) of the patent statute requires a patent appli-
cant to teach those of ordinary skill the manner of making and using the
claimed invention.153  This terminology runs throughout U.S. patent law; for
example, § 271 grants patent holders the exclusive right to “make[ ], [and]
use[ ]” the claimed invention;154 and patentable novelty is defined in terms
of making and use.155  These terms apply in a fairly straightforward way to
product inventions; we can sensibly speak of making and using machines,
manufactures, and compositions.  The terminology makes only half as much
sense when it comes to processes, however; we can sensibly speak of using a
process, but we typically do not speak of processes as being made—processes
are perhaps implemented or arranged or catalyzed, but not made.
However, making and using are themselves terms that imply processes,
and process patents are frequently divided into the categories of “methods of
making” and “methods of using.”156  Section 101 itself makes no mention of
these distinctions, and does not explicitly limit the universe of patentable
processes to these categories.  But as a practical matter, it is fairly difficult to
imagine a process that does not fall into one or the other of these two classifi-
cations, and it seems likely that any candidate for an alternative classification
could be redefined so as to fit into the categories of making or using.
Indeed, it is typical that a process falling into one of these categories can
often be reconceived as falling into the other; processes of making necessa-
rily use some type of input, and processes of using typically generate, or
make, some type of output.157
This indicates an implicit but unavoidable relationship between the two
broad types of subject matter found in § 101.  Products, at least to the extent
that they constitute objects, are inherent in the concept of process, including
processes of making and using.  Making and using entail some type of object;
something is made, and something is used.  In classic industrial settings, the
substrates of the process were fairly apparent, and extant in what is now
§ 101; machines and materials visibly interacted as inputs generating outputs.
As the Supreme Court long ago explained in Cochrane v. Deener:
151 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
152 See JOE RAPOSO & JEFFREY MOSS, THE SESAME STREET SONGBOOK 40 (1971).
153 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
154 Id. § 271(a).
155 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 395 (noting the terminology threaded through
provisions of the patent statute).
156 See Burk, supra note 22, at 564.
157 See Burk, supra note 39, at 43.
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A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result.  It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to
be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.  If new and useful,
it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. . . . The machinery pointed
out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable;
whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new
result.  The process requires that certain things should be done with certain
substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may
be of secondary consequence.158
This passage, filtered through the decisions of the Benson trilogy, ulti-
mately formed the basis for the bright-line “machine or transformation test”
developed by the Federal Circuit, and held by the Supreme Court in Bilski to
constitute a possible subject matter test, although not the sole determinant of
process patent eligibility.159  In particular, Justice Kennedy’s Bilski opinion
explicitly declined to limit patent eligibility to machines or transformations
of matter due to the probability of thereby excluding inventions in areas such
as programming and diagnostics that might not fit this definition of
materiality.160
And yet, however tempting it may be to believe that modern inventions
such as software or diagnostic methods are somehow different than more
“classical” processes, this view is deceptive.161  There are no immaterial
processes.  The substrates of contemporary informational processes may
seem invisible, or even absent, but they are surely there as circuits, storage
devices, or other apparatus.162  Even mental processes necessarily entail
material interactions: neurons fire, ions diffuse, membranes polarize, neuro-
transmitters bind.
The materiality of any given process thus implicates the subject matter
exclusions for laws of nature and related doctrines.  The interactions among
components in a process necessarily follow the causal order of the universe,
which is to say that they follow the causal statements we call natural laws,
which are themselves generalized statements about processes.163  Such causal
relationships can typically be described in the representative language of
mathematics, which can of course describe objects, but which is very typically
used to describe the relationships among objects.  Mathematics is a step
removed from phenomena of nature, although it may be integral to describe
such phenomena.164
158 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877).
159 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604–05 (2010). See generally Dreyfuss & Evans, supra
note 110 (reviewing the Bilski holding).
160 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605–06.
161 Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 395, 396–418 (Ove Granstrande ed., 2003) (arguing that software, DNA, and
other information is physically instantiated).
162 Jean-Francois Blanchette, A Material History of Bits, 62 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH.
1042, 1042 (2011).
163 See supra text accompanying notes 86–90.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 77–79.
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And this is, of course, the reason that the Supreme Court has primarily
addressed the laws of nature doctrine and its companion subject matter
exclusions in the context of software, where they occur so often.  Software is
not mathematics, as the Court seems once to have supposed in Benson,165 but
both are expressive forms of logic.  Neither constitutes natural law, but either
may constitute an expression of causal material relationships, rendered sym-
bolically rather than physically.  Thus, as Phil Agre once observed, computers
are able to model anything that can be described in text, as they are
machines that are inscribed with text.166
Indeed we might say that software defines a set of physical relationships
that may model other relationships.  Software itself is in large measure a sym-
bolic representation of a logical apparatus, albeit an executable representa-
tion capable of configuring a physical apparatus.167  Although one could
build hardwired machines that are the functional equivalent of software, we
more typically write expressions that temporarily configure universal
machines to particular tasks.168  Thus software routinely collapses the usually
comfortable distance between symbolic expression and physical instantiation,
concomitantly collapsing the distance between laws of nature and their mate-
rial substrates.  And this mercurial character of software, seeming sometimes
an apparatus, and sometimes the state of an apparatus, more than any other
current technology reveals the untenable division between product and pro-
cess in the patents that claim it.169
B. A Process by Any Other Name
The Supreme Court’s twentieth-century software cases and their twenty-
first century counterparts have thus been the primary vehicle by which the
Court has articulated the related set of subject matter exclusions denomi-
nated mental steps, abstract ideas, and laws of nature.  But these same exclu-
sions could be and on occasion have been formulated as disclosure problems
that in the United States run afoul of the enablement and written description
requirements of § 112.  The American patent statute requires the patent
applicant to provide a disclosure that enables one of ordinary skill to make
and use the claimed invention; the applicant is also required to describe the
invention in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill would know she has
possession of what is claimed.170  Thus, the disclosure in the patent must be
commensurate with the scope of the claims: a patentee who wants to claim
165 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972).
166 Philip E. Agre, Internet Research: For and Against, in 1 INTERNET RESEARCH ANNUAL:
SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNET RESEARCHERS CONFERENCES
2000–2002, at 25, 27 (Mia Consalvo et al. eds., 2004).
167 See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2316 (1994).
168 Id. at 2320.
169 See Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587,
609–10.  As should be clear by now, biotechnology comes in a close second. See id.
170 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
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more must disclose more; patentees who disclose less are only entitled to
claim less.  Claims drawn to mental steps, abstract ideas, and natural princi-
ples are all difficult to enable, or to properly describe.  How does one enable
a particular thought, or all embodiments of a general principle?
The solution to this problem has often been to draft process claims as if
they were product claims, in terms of the apparatus or physical substrates
involved.171  Such drafting lends a veneer of tangibility to claims that might
otherwise seem abstract or conceptual.  Indeed, this might seem to be the
lesson of the Benson/Flook/Diehr trilogy: processes in the first two cases that
produced a numerically represented output were held patent ineligible,
whereas the process in the third case that produced a solid and palpable
industrial product—such as a tire—passed patent muster.
Of course, as I have suggested in the discussion of software above, the
disfavored numerical outputs in Benson and Flook were not in fact ephemeral,
ideal objects: they were embedded in some solid and palpable substrate.172
Binary representations—the 0s and 1s of machine-readable computer code—
are visualized as numbers, which seem fairly conceptual or ephemeral.  But
in an actual digital processor, they are implemented as high and low voltages
in a circuit.  Patent claims can describe them in either formulation; if a
numerical characterization seems overly abstract, the same invention can be
claimed as the state of voltages hardware.  Consequently, for many years after
the Court’s twentieth-century subject matter trilogy it became the norm in
the United States to avoid claims with generalized expressions of numerical
output, couching the claims instead in terms of their substrate.173  Similarly,
the two-step analysis in Alice Corp. seems to suggest that the second step
becomes moot if the initial step has been sufficiently tied to a structural
claim.  And as I have already mentioned, in the EPO, too, claims that recite
any type of apparatus are now considered patent eligible (although likely to
be denied on other grounds such as obviousness).174
Lemley and Cohen refer to this dodge as “the doctrine of the magic
words” whereby one description of an invention is disallowed while an alter-
native description of the same thing is permissible.175  But this kind of exer-
cise becomes tedious at some point, not to mention counterproductive.  Even
though clever drafting can describe an invention in either process terms or
product terms, inventions typically lend themselves to one type of description
or another.176  Although it is possible to describe machines, manufactures,
and compositions in terms of functional relationships, this tends to be awk-
171 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 161–69.
173 See Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 110, at 1357.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 145–50.
175 Cohen & Lemley, supra note 171, at 9.
176 Cf. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1537–38 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to characterize genetically modified cells as
“‘non-traditional’ process claims”).
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ward—indeed, one specialized form of claiming where this was regularized,
by which inventions were claimed in terms of the process that made them,
led to ongoing controversies about the claim scope that are still not entirely
settled.177  Instead of roundabout functional descriptions, the most straight-
forward description of product inventions will tend to be largely or wholly
structural.  And although process claims can be written in terms of the sub-
strates that stand in a particular process relationship, the most natural and
straightforward description of a process will tend to focus on the relationship
rather than the structures—even though this type of description will tend to
appear abstract, conceptual, or naturally phenomenological.
Even when not employed to avoid a laws of nature characterization, the
commonality of process and product claims routinely engender interlocking
claims of each type.  The relationships between novel materials may them-
selves be patentably novel, just as patentably novel relationships may give rise
to novel materials.178  Thus a new technological development often gives rise
to both process and product claims that following § 101 are considered
related but separate inventions.  This was, for example, the case for Myriad’s
DNA sequences; the company held patents claiming not simply the DNA
sequences for certain cancer-inducing genes, but also patents claiming the
process of using those sequences in a diagnostic test.
The initial suit against Myriad considered both the DNA product claims
and the associated process claims; the plaintiffs who challenged the gene pat-
ents considered by the Supreme Court initially challenged the diagnostic pat-
ents as well.  And although the Mayo opinion is conspicuously absent from
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its Myriad opinion, and for that matter
makes only brief cameo appearances in the Federal Circuit’s reconsideration
of Myriad on remand, it played a starring role in the diagnostic process rea-
soning of the lower courts.  Neither the diagnostic claims nor the rationale
for rejecting them ever reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari
only on the question of patent eligibility for human genes.
Both the trial court and the Federal Circuit unanimously agreed that the
process claims were not patent eligible.179  Myriad’s diagnostic process was to
compare a patient’s BRCA1 sequence to a set of reference sequences known
to predispose carriers toward cancer, and to conclude from the comparison
whether the patient was predisposed toward cancer.180  All of the judges to
examine the question agreed that Myriad had simply claimed a natural corre-
lation between a particular nucleotide sequence and the propensity to can-
177 Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that
infringement of product-by-process claims requires use of the defining process).
178 Sorting such patentability out has become known as the Durden problem, from the
line of cases grappling with these issues. See Burk, supra note 39, at 50–53; Burk, supra
note 22, at 572–75.
179 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 683 F.3d 1329,
1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 233–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
180 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
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cer, paralleling the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mayo v. Prometheus.  Just as
in the case of software, this ineligible claim might be characterized in a vari-
ety of ways.  Judge Lourie, writing for a unanimous Federal Circuit, reasoned
that quite apart from the Supreme Court’s natural law reasoning in Mayo, the
Myriad “comparing” and “analyzing” process claims attempted to claim a cor-
relation that constituted an “abstract” mental step.181
But this application of the Mayo logic is troubling, since on this logic all
diagnostic procedures seem at risk of exclusion from the patent system.
Diagnosis is by definition a process of deduction, which necessarily involves
incidental correlation.  Any diagnosis relies on natural relationships to define
such correlations: the patient displays a symptom or characteristic associated
with disease, or does not display a symptom or characteristic associated with
disease; the observer concludes from the presence or absence of the particu-
lar indicator that the patient does or does not have the associated disease.  If
the presence of such natural correlations precludes patenting, then diagnos-
tic methods seem generally unpatentable.
This outcome is all the more puzzling in light of the Supreme Court’s
endorsement at the end of its Myriad opinion of process claims to genetic
testing that may incorporate unpatentable genomic DNA.  Perhaps intending
to reassure the U.S. biotechnology industry that has for the last three decades
flourished around gene patents, the opinion disclaims certain implications of
its analysis, hinting that these areas remain legitimate or at least undisturbed
by its ruling.182  The first of these encompasses what might otherwise be
called methods of making and methods of use, although the Court does not
employ such terminology, referring instead to “method[s] of manipulating
genes” or to “applications of knowledge about” the DNA sequences.183  These,
the Court says, are not part of its holding, and might have been permissible
subject matter for Myriad to have claimed.184  And yet the unanimous hold-
ing of the lower courts seems inescapable: that the logic of Mayo precludes
what the Myriad dictum on processes says should be permissible.
V. PROCESSES AND PREEMPTION
The recurring theme of the laws of nature doctrine within cases that
contemplate process claims is no accident.  Of the categories enumerated in
§ 101, two categories imply human craftsmanship—machines are typically
thought of as made by humans,185 as are articles of manufacture.  Composi-
181 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).




185 One might debate whether there are naturally occurring “machines.”  For example,
certain bacteria have a wheel and axle structure that drives their flagella. See STEVEN
VOGEL, COMPARATIVE BIOMECHANICS 455 (2d ed. 2013).  However, denominating such
structures as “machines” seems more of an analogy than a proper ontology.
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tions of matter might be human artifacts or they might be assembled without
human intervention.  While some processes might be arranged by humans,
the vast majority of processes occur outside of human control or even human
cognition.  This raises the question of whether one can have an “unnatural”
or “artificial” process.  Even those processes practiced by humans follow or
rely upon the causal order of the universe.  Any process claim inherently
entails a “natural” law, which is to say a causal relationship among its sub-
strates that can be exploited by humans, but never created de novo.
Thus all processes are at some level “natural” and, if viewed as constitut-
ing no more than their underlying causal relationships, seem most likely to
be disallowed as claiming laws of nature.  Avoiding that characterization is
inevitably a descriptive question.  Processes most likely to avoid that label
seem to be characterized by the status of the substrates of that process—
relationships among machines and manufactures are most likely to appear
“non-natural” if characterized in terms of the human artifacts on which the
process depends.  Processes related to compositions of matter, which may be
human artifacts or not, present more of a problem.
The Supreme Court’s endorsement of process inventions at the end of
the Myriad opinion suggests a similar tack.  As we have seen, Mayo and its
predecessor laws of nature cases are process cases.  Following the “magic
words” regime of abstract ideas in software, one might argue that the out-
come in Mayo and in the intermediate Myriad decision stem not so much
from claims that entail a natural correlation as they do from the presence of
claims encompassing all of a class of methods that entail a natural correla-
tion.  Some commentators have dubbed this the “preemption” doctrine that
bars patents on concepts that would “preempt” large swaths of future
innovation.186
Justice Thomas went to some length to reaffirm this rationale in Alice
Corp.: the Court there refers to the forbidden categories of abstract ideas,
products of nature, and natural laws as “building blocks” that cannot be
claimed lest they become unavailable to future innovators.187  Justice
Thomas formulates from this a two-part subject matter test, founded on the
earlier Mayo decision, that requires a court to first ask if a claimed invention
is a building block category, and then if it is, whether the claims entail an
“inventive concept” that is more than a claim to the building block.188  The
implication seems to be that if the claims in such patents were narrower,
confined to a particular instantiation or apparatus, then either they would
become sufficiently concrete to avoid the abstraction label, or they would not
“preempt” all the future applications of the principle.189
But this formulation of the Court’s preemption jurisprudence cannot be
entirely correct.  As Professor Strandburg points out, the Supreme Court in
186 See Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 110, at 1359; Strandburg, supra note 13, at 565.
187 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (citing Mayo Collabora-
tive Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012)).
188 Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
189 See Burk, supra note 7, at 747–48.
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both Flook and Mayo has invalidated claims that were unlikely to preempt a
wide swath of anything.190  The language of Mayo suggests that it is the type
of claim, rather than the expected effect of any given claim, that triggers the
exclusion.191  Probably, then, the tendency to preempt is a marker rather
than a justification; the issue is not so much avoiding a type of technological
monopoly as it is identifying problematic claims by virtue of their potential to
preempt future development.  In Myriad, Justice Thomas stresses, via multi-
ple repetitions, an underlying policy rationale that some inputs to innovation
are so fundamental that they must remain unencumbered by exclusive
rights.192  Claims that would forestall the development of future technologies
are likely also those that, due to their breadth, would cover those future
technologies.
As indicated above, one response to past subject matter decisions has
been to draft around them; to reformulate process claims as the instantiation
of material products.193  Viewing the Supreme Court’s subject matter juris-
prudence as a jeremiad against preemption once again implies that the
abstract ideas and principles of nature doctrines are indeed drafting
problems: Myriad or Prometheus might not have lost process claims that
were drafted more narrowly, in terms of a discrete mechanism or particular
apparatus.  The Court has said that the addition of “insignificant postsolution
activity” to impermissibly abstract claims is not enough to pass subject matter
muster,194 but that admonition simply shunts the drafting in a particular
direction.  More limited claims might be patent eligible as not having been
drawn to a natural principle per se.  This is, again, similar to the position
reached in the European Patent Office, which seems resigned to allowing
claims that recite any physical instantiation, even if it then disallows them on
other grounds.195
But if the breadth of the claims is the problem, then we have already
seen that the commensurability principle of § 112, that the inventor can only
claim what she teaches,196 provides a workable limit on claim breadth that
seems to obviate the need for an additional § 101 limit.  Additionally, this
rationale for a principle of nature limitation leaves the question of subject
matter very much dependent on the skill of the “draftsman” in the fashion
that the Court has repeatedly deplored.197  The Supreme Court has said on
several occasions, most recently in Alice Corp., that the provenance of patenta-
190 See Strandburg, supra note 13, at 583–84; see also Rai, supra note 14, at 113 (discuss-
ing the “bright-line” approach in Mayo).
191 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
192 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
193 See supra text accompanying note 171.
194 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981); see Mayo, 132 S. Ct at 1298 (quoting
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 146–50.
196 See supra text accompanying note 170.
197 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)); Diehr,
450 U.S. at 192.
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ble subject matter should not be dependent on canny drafting,198 and yet the
rule articulated in Mayo seems to push the patentee toward exactly such
drafting.
Either the Court is unaware of the tension between its insistence that
patent eligibility not be subordinated to draftsmanship and its insistence that
subject matter not “preempt” general principles, or it seems to be favoring
draftsmanship of a certain kind.  The Alice Corp. opinion stresses the ineligibil-
ity of inventions that are “fundamental”;199 the line of cases running from
Mayo back to Benson suggests that claims to tangible embodiments will pass
muster under the laws of nature analysis and so must not be “fundamen-
tal.”200  The two-part subject matter test articulated in Mayo and Alice Corp.
suggests that a narrow, specific instantiation of an otherwise abstract inven-
tion might survive the second step.201  One might conclude that the jurispru-
dence of “laws of nature” is intended to push patentees toward narrower,
more specific claims on tangible instantiations.
This policy of maintaining fundamental access to critical constructs is
probably correct, and is perhaps the most sensible reading of the process
subject matter cases.202  In previous work with Mark Lemley, I have suggested
that the cluster of doctrines around the laws of nature exclusion may act as
judicial “policy levers,” by which we meant a type of flexible doctrine that
courts can use to modulate an otherwise uniform patent statute to the inno-
vation needs of particular technologies.203  Excluding conceptual inventions
from patent eligibility pushes exclusivity further downstream to the stage of
finished products, requiring narrower claims on concrete implementations,
rather than allowing conceptual patents early in the development of a
technology.204
This rationale makes far more sense than to claim that certain ideas are
off-limits to the patent system because they are not the product of human
invention.  As discussed above, the models articulated by Newton, Bohr, or
others are certainly the product of human ingenuity, and casting them as
found rather than built is at best a convenient epistemological fiction.205
Rather, such models are better viewed as off-limits because they are essential
components to all applied innovation.  Under this logic, to the extent that
their models of causal ordering are useful or necessary to applied innovation,
those expressions remain unpatented and available; once they are super-
198 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014).
199 Id. at 2355–57.
200 See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
201 See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60.
202 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 407–08.
203 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 95 (2009) (quoting Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002)).
204 Id. at 122–24.  Professor Lemley has subsequently elaborated on this argument with
an expansive cohort of co-authors. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1315, 1328–29 (2011).
205 See supra text accompanying notes 88–90.
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seded or fall into desuetude, a patent controlling their use would be unneces-
sary anyway.
What is perhaps more troubling is that although nothing about this pol-
icy is extant in § 101, as observed above, it is a theme that crops up more
explicitly in other sections of the statute, which seem to be designed to guard
against much the same problem that the products of nature doctrine might
be said to embody.  In particular, I have already noted the problem that
§ 112 precludes patent claims that are not enabled or fairly described by the
specification.206  Claims that read on fundamental laws or principles are
almost certainly not supported by their accompanying disclosure, which can-
not feasibly enable or describe all technologies that might be based on such a
discovery.207  Thus, to take again Justice Stevens’s example of the qualities of
metals, discussed above,208 one who attempted to claim characteristics such
as a certain ductility or resistance would face the impossible task of enabling
all instances of such at the time the claims were filed.  Thus, among its other
functions, enablement acts as a type of temporal brake, forestalling claims
that are premature.  Why then replicate this function by creating a similar
doctrine within the § 101 subject matter inquiry?
The answer may lie in the applicability of the two rules to differing situa-
tions.  First, unlike the § 112 disclosure doctrines, the cluster of “abstract
ideas” doctrines polices the upstream availability of fundamental technolo-
gies on an invention-by-invention basis, rather than as a blanket rule applied
to an entire technological sector.209  Because § 112 is statutorily calibrated to
the level of skill in the art,210 commensurability grounded in that section will
apply to entire fields of technology.  Although certain technologies are more
likely to lend themselves to the rule on abstractions, nothing in § 101
requires blanket application to an entire field.  Additionally, since patent eli-
gibility is an antecedent question to patentability, a doctrine situated in § 101
analysis is typically antecedent to § 112 analysis.  This may be attractive from
the standpoint of judicial economy or simply judicial preference.211  A nar-
rowing doctrine drawn from § 101 may obviate the need for detailed exami-
206 See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
207 Cf. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 124 (1854) (invalidating overbroad
claims that encompassed all applications of electromagnetic communication).  The Morse
case is often cited, including by the Court in Mayo, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012), for the proposition that laws of nature lie
outside patentable subject matter, when in fact it is better read for the principle of com-
mensurability between claims and disclosure.
208 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text; see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
209 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 203, at 122–24.
210 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
211 Contra Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1674 (2010); Lemley et al.,
supra note 204, at 1342 (arguing that patentability should be assessed before patent
eligibility).
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nation of the patent disclosure, which may be attractive if a court is reluctant
to wade into the details of a technology—particularly, for example, the
Supreme Court.
VI. PRODUCTS AND PREEMPTION
What we have seen to this point about the purpose and effect of exclud-
ing natural processes from patenting suggests that the Court expects that the
products of nature doctrine should be enrolled toward a similar purpose, lim-
iting patent scope by pushing patent eligibility away from fundamental
materials and toward completed products.212  If this parallel to Mayo and its
antecedents is to be accepted, then just as the Supreme Court believes that
certain observations describing patterns of causal occurrence are so funda-
mental to innovation that they must remain free of patent encumbrance, so it
seems it believes that certain substances or materials are sufficiently funda-
mental to applied innovation that they must be similarly off-limits to the pat-
ent system.  This purpose also implies other correspondences of the Myriad
opinion’s products of nature doctrine to the laws of nature doctrine, such as
the need for a separate invention-by-invention policy lever that might be
more appropriate than the § 112 disclosure doctrines for limiting fundamen-
tal product claims.
Yet if avoiding preemption of downstream technologies is to be the justi-
fication for the products of nature doctrine, it is critical to recognize just how
such preemption may differ from that of the established laws of nature doc-
trine.  As an initial matter, it is a little difficult to see why the doctrine should
be a product of nature doctrine.  Effectively, the target of the doctrine is the
§ 101 category of compositions of matter—where products “of nature” are
concerned, we must be considering either exclusively or primarily the § 101
category of compositions of matter.  As indicated above, the categories of
machines and manufactures inherently carry the connotation of human crea-
tion; there is unlikely to be concern over “manufactures of nature” or
“machines of nature.”213  And yet it is unclear why compositions of matter
should be necessarily more fundamental, or more the building blocks of
downstream innovation, than certain machines or manufactures, or why
machines and manufactures are better limited by § 112 commensurability
than by subject matter.
Relatedly, this rationale for a products of nature doctrine requires us to
ask whether one can have a pristinely artificial or “non-natural” composition
of matter—just as every process is ultimately a “natural” physical process, so
every composition is a “naturally” occurring material.  It is a big planet, a
212 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of
DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 785 (2000) (“The standard patent lawyer’s response to
the ‘products of nature’ limitation is to treat it as a technical, claim-drafting problem.”).
213 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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bigger solar system, an immense universe.214  Given enough time and
enough heat, any possible composition will be generated somewhere by phys-
ical processes, without human direction.215  Thus all compositions will be
found in nature if only you look far enough.  An inherency rationale would
exclude such fortuitous synthesis from consideration of patent eligibility as
well as patentability,216 and the Supreme Court appears to have endorsed
such a rationale in Myriad,217 but that rationale suggests that natural occur-
rence is really beside the point.  Natural occurrence does not and cannot
serve as a marker for preemption; some other indicia of benefit or detriment
of a product patent to downstream innovation is necessary.
It would also seem that the need for a laws or processes of nature doc-
trine is far more compelling than the need for products of nature doctrine.
Principles of nature are antecedent to material interactions, whatever degree
of human intervention may characterize them.  A mineral in the earth, or
extracted ore containing the mineral, or compound smelted from the ore, or
component forged from the compound, or machine constructed from such
components all behave according to the causal observational statements we
call natural law.  DNA molecules, whether cDNA or gDNA, and whether con-
sidered “natural” or “artificial,” follow the same principles of chemistry and
physics.  Thus there is a need to maintain access to fundamental principles at
every stage of innovative activity, but this is not necessarily the case where
materials are concerned.  All inventions rely on fundamental principles, but
not all inventions rely on fundamental compositions.  The applicability of a
fundamental compositions doctrine would seem more limited than that for
fundamental principles.
It may be that compositions, like processes, are somewhat more likely to
be antecedent to the other § 101 subject matter categories—everything must
be made of something, just as everything must operate according to some
causality.  This is perhaps an argument for some type of common pool ratio-
nale, what the Supreme Court has rather breezily dubbed the “storehouse of
knowledge,”218 by which fundamental compositions are excluded from pat-
ent eligibility so as to maintain public availability.  But it is not necessarily an
argument informed by downstream preemption, since as we have just seen,
the applicability of the fundamentality rationale is likely to be far more sparse
for compositions than for processes.  Everything must be composed of some-
214 Cf. DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 76 (1979) (“Space . . .
is big.  Really big.  You just won’t believe how vastly hugely mind-bogglingly big it is.  I
mean, you may think it’s a long way down the road to the chemist, but that’s just peanuts to
space.”).
215 See Burk, supra note 126, at 95–97.
216 Id.; see Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 404–06 (arguing for an inherency rationale
regarding products of nature).
217 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 n.8
(2013) (“The possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might randomly create a
molecule similar to one created synthetically through human ingenuity does not render a
composition of matter nonpatentable.”).
218 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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thing, but we decidedly do not want to categorically exclude all compositions
from patent eligibility the way that we want to exclude all abstract principles.
Additionally, the applicability of a fundamental products doctrine may
be altered by the different developmental role or position played by composi-
tions as opposed to fundamental processes.  For example, looking at laws of
nature, the development of fundamental concepts and their embodiments is
not likely to follow a clean linear progression from concept to applications.
It may be that Newton first develops his laws of motion, and others then find
ways to apply them to new inventions.  But it is far more likely, both as a
practical and historical matter, that many inventions are developed that
incorporate these unarticulated laws before Newton eventually formulates his
general statements as to how such inventions behave.  In fact, Newton may
well be relying on the accumulated knowledge regarding previous technolo-
gies in developing his articulation of their causality.
In contrast, development of technology from fundamental materials is
more likely to proceed in a cumulative progression from discovery to applica-
tion—one needs to have the basic materials in hand as a starting point or
fundament on which to build specific implementations.  There may of course
be cases where technologies comprising certain materials are developed
ahead of the materials’ discovery, where applied invention unwittingly incor-
porates later-identified materials.  But in the cases where this does occur, the
doctrine of inherency will determine as a matter of novelty whether we allow
a patent on an invention that was already present, based upon whether the
public was already benefitting from the unidentified invention.219  The poli-
cies behind inherency may have a bearing on how we treat products of
nature, militating in favor of patents where some new benefit is realized by
the discovery.220
From the standpoint of patent law, this means that patent claims cover-
ing a law of nature are far more likely to take something away from the pub-
lic, something that is already in common use.  Existing inventions will follow
the principles articulated by Newton or Maxwell or Boltzmann prior to their
discovery by those theorists—there is in fact no other way that the existing
inventions could work—and granting a broad right in the principle would
constrain or remove something already conferring a benefit.  A number of
doctrines in American patent law, including the inherency principle, are
designed to prevent exactly such removals from the public domain,221 and
the law of nature doctrine seems coherent with this general policy.  The same
is not necessarily true for products of nature, which may convey something
new to the public, and which are more likely to require investment to move
the material from initial synthesis to applied technology.  This militates in
219 Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 379–84.
220 See Burk, supra note 141, at 113–14; Burk & Lemley, supra note 79, at 407.
221 See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (inherent anticipation); Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (on-sale bar).
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favor of a far more nuanced products of nature doctrine than law of nature
doctrine.
This observation highlights the difficulty in identifying which products
are fundamental.  Identifying when a product claim lies sufficiently far
upstream in the innovation process to merit treatment as a product of nature
will require a different metric than that applicable to a law of nature.  Recog-
nizing when a claim is overly abstract, drawn to a fundamental principle, is,
as we have seen, a somewhat problematic exercise,222 but courts can likely
make a good guess as to when process claims lack the necessary substance to
qualify as patentable subject matter.  The degree of abstraction serves as a
rough metric of the sort of claim breadth likely to preempt future uses.
A similar estimate for the essentiality of a product seems a far more diffi-
cult exercise; abstraction or conceptuality are not necessarily characteristic of
preemptive material claims.  To take the instant example, far from being
couched in abstraction, the Myriad DNA claims were quite precisely deline-
ated to a particular and defined set of structures; indeed the trial court’s
rationale that the specific sequences constituted “information” rather than
material was largely a rhetorical move intended to cast the claims as somehow
conceptual in a new or different fashion.223  Here, the puzzling vacillation of
the Supreme Court’s Myriad opinion between structure and function puts
the whole preemption exercise in doubt.  It is not at all clear how gDNA is in
any sense more fundamental or essential than its corresponding cDNA, and
the Myriad opinion certainly gives no concrete guidance as to what might
make one more essential than the other.
To state the matter somewhat differently, although the more recent Alice
Corp. opinion is as silent as Holmes’s hound about how Myriad is supposed to
fit into the Mayo framework, every indication is that Justice Thomas somehow
expected it to do so.224  The unarticulated implication of the opinion seems
to be that products will be measured by the two-step Mayo/Alice Corp. test just
as processes are: first assess whether the material is a “building block” prod-
uct of nature, and then if it is, assess the patent for an “inventive concept”
that makes the patent more than a claim to the prohibited fundamental
category.225
It is nearly impossible to comprehend how this might work in the case of
products.  I have already outlined above how difficult it will be to recognize
222 See text accompanying notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
223 Thus the parallel drawn by Lemley et al. between laws of nature and products of
nature—that “the analysis [in each case] turns on whether the patent claims describe the
application of human knowledge to a practical end, rather than merely identification of
the existence of useful properties”—is too facile. See Lemley et al., supra note 204, at 1329.
This falls into the Funk Bros. error of confusing product characteristics, which are not
claimed, with the product claims themselves. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying
text.  The unpatentable Myriad claims were directed to specific structures, not to specific
properties.
224 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116–18
(2013).
225 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014).
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claims to a preemptive “building block” material; it will not have the indicia
the Court has suggested might be used to identify “building block” princi-
ples.226  Some commentators have suggested that factors such as the breadth
of claims, the number of disclosed embodiments, and the likelihood of
cumulative improvements might be used to determine what should fall under
the abstract ideas or laws of nature exceptions.227  There is considerable
merit to such suggestions, but I am chary of their potential application to
determine the “building block” status for products of nature.  As I have just
shown, product claims will not have the proxy of process abstraction to signal
over-breadth, and it is far less clear what it might mean for a claim to a sub-
stance to be impermissibly broad.  Since the temporality of fundamental
materials discovery is different than that of fundamental principles discovery,
the likelihood of future cumulative innovation may be difficult to assess.228
The Supreme Court may treat products and laws of nature as equivalent, but
the reality of product and process claiming means they will not be equivalent
in practice.
And on the second step, it is difficult to imagine what might constitute
the necessary “inventive concept” to carry claims beyond whatever the mate-
rial analog for “insignificant post-solution activity” might be.  In Alice Corp.,
the Court hints that some specialized hardware or advance in computer tech-
nology might have satisfied the inventive concept requirement, where rou-
tine implementation in a general computer system did not.229  The analog
for compositions seems opaque.  Specifically, taking the analysis of Myriad as
exemplar, gDNA apparently failed the Mayo/Alice Corp. test where cDNA did
not.  Since both had the same “building block” information, apparently the
cDNA claims entailed an inventive concept.  But if the “information”—which
is to say, the nucleotide sequence—of the BRCA1 gene constitutes an ineligi-
ble “building block,” then it is difficult to see how removal of intervening
sequences via reverse transcription is inventive enough to make the informa-
tion patent eligible as cDNA.  If anything, this seems entirely routine and
uninventive.
CONCLUSION
My goal here has been to divine the implicit connection that the
Supreme Court has suggested should be found between the patentable sub-
ject matter doctrines regarding products of nature and laws of nature.  Doing
so requires, as an initial matter, imposing some degree of conceptual coher-
226 See supra text accompanying notes 222–23.
227 See Lemley et al., supra note 204, at 1334 (suggesting a multi-factor test to identify
“fundamental” abstract ideas); Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AT THE EDGE 361, 377–80 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014)
(delineating a “multi-factored, policy-driven test for patentable subject matter”); see also
Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1180
(2014) (suggesting a similar multi-factor test to identify patent ineligible laws of nature).
228 See supra text accompanying notes 218–19.
229 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60.
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ence on the Court’s laws of nature jurisprudence in order to see what corre-
spondence might exist between the two doctrines.  Probably the best
explanation of the laws of nature cases remains the theory that the doctrine
operates as a doctrinal lever intended to force abstract, fundamental claims
toward specific, narrowed claims over downstream products.
But as I have shown here, the operation of this lever is intimately bound
up in the distinction between product and process.  However often the Court
may casually throw processes and products of nature together in the same
passage, the two cannot be treated identically.  As matters stand now, the lack
of any statutory guidance, not to mention the lack of judicial coherence,
makes such a policy on fundamental products nearly impossible to administer
as there are no discernable criteria as to what materials are fundamental or
essential and what materials are not. Myriad affirms the existence of the
products of nature doctrine and points toward a parallel with the preemption
rationale of the laws of nature doctrine, but offers no guidance as to how
such a rationale might function.  The Supreme Court’s silence on that score,
far from offering a clue as to the doctrine’s intended purpose, seems simply
to be a void that the lower courts have been left to fill.
